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
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


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[JORDAN: An agreement announced yesterday between the government and the fedayeen may fail to defuse a new confrontation.

The new agreement, which is supposed to be carried out before 1200 EDT today, calls for the withdrawal of fedayeen from the streets of Amman in return for the withdrawal of the army from the outskirts of the city. The fedayeen are not to interfere with civil or military personnel, search houses, or arrest people, and their military bases in the city are to be removed; by the same token, military and public security personnel are not to interfere with the fedayeen. The fedayeen are to be allowed a "token presence" at such places as the post office, the power generators, and the water pumps. A joint government-fedayeen committee is to enforce the agreement, which will be extended to other cities after it has been carried out in Amman.

Shortly after the announcement, however, there were press reports that Prime Minister Rifai had resigned. The press speculated that Rifai's resignation could lead to the forming of a military government. Such a step would indicate that King Husayn, whose patience may well be wearing thin, is moving toward a confrontation with the fedayeen at last. The US Embassy in Amman believes, however, that the fedayeen have too much at stake to accept the King's terms, which could signify the end of the fedayeen movement as a major force in Jordanian politics. Rather than leave Amman, where they have the upper hand and a certain amount of protection from attack, the fedayeen will probably dig in [REDACTED]

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[Large-scale fighting between the army and the fedayeen could bode ill for the future of the hostages still being held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Swiss diplomats in Amman fear that the hostages may be taken to particularly dangerous locations to forestall a possible military move against the commandos. The British]

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[believe that the PFLP position is likely to toughen with the passage of time and that the PFLP may underscore its demands by hijacking another plane or killing the hostages one by one.

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The PFLP also seems to be growing increasingly impatient. In a press statement issued yesterday, the PFLP said that it now believes that the Red Cross is playing a biased role and attempting to buy time for the "imperialist states," thus shirking its duty as a disinterested party. In an obvious maneuver to split the European countries from the US and Israel, the PFLP said direct responsibility for their own people now falls upon the shoulders of the states concerned, and that it is incumbent upon these states to announce their agreement to the front's demands. Israel, the PFLP said, must agree in principle to return the two Algerians recently taken off a TWA plane along with one Swiss accused of belonging to the PFLP and ten Lebanese soldiers. The PFLP would then name the prisoners Israel must release in exchange for the release of the Israelis and dual citizens being held.

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CAMBODIA: There is increasing concern in Phnom Penh over the status of the Cambodian Army task force attempting to reach Kompong Thom along Route 6.

Prime Minister Lon Nol ordered the task force's commander to Phnom Penh yesterday to "explain" his decision to withdraw from Tang Kauk village after failing to dislodge Communist forces there. The government lost 20 killed and 102 wounded in the fighting for the village.

Military authorities in the capital are also telling newsmen that the 4,000 - 5,000-man task force is now surrounded and the Cambodians have no means to extract them. The tactical situation on the ground may not be as serious as press reports out of Phnom Penh suggest. There is no evidence, for example, that substantial numbers of additional enemy troops have moved into the immediate area.


Lon Nol, who personally ordered the Kompong Thom operation, in any event will probably be reluctant to order its termination, especially because the government has portrayed it as a major step forward in the fight against the Communists. He probably will first request additional allied air support to help get the task force moving again, but if that fails, he may as a last resort call on the South Vietnamese to help airlift the Cambodian troops out.



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NORTH VIETNAM - COMMUNIST CHINA: Hanoi's current negotiations with Peking for economic and military aid may be directed toward long-range economic planning.

The delegation, now in Peking, is headed by the chairman of North Vietnam's State Planning Commission, Nguyen Con, instead of by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi as is customary. This may indicate that Hanoi is seeking aid for long-range economic development, perhaps as part of a three- or five-year plan. Since 1965, Chinese economic assistance has consisted largely of the provision of foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and other commodity aid aimed at keeping North Vietnam's economy afloat.

Peking has ranked second to Moscow as a source of aid for North Vietnam, averaging about \$200 million annually since 1965. It has provided almost 25 percent of the approximately \$4 billion in economic and military assistance (computed at foreign trade prices) from all Communist countries.

Peking's heavy press coverage of the delegation's visit is larded with commentary about the war, probably in an attempt to build the impression that China is North Vietnam's chief supporter in the Indochina conflict and to eclipse the USSR's role in Hanoi. The delegation can be expected to continue on to the USSR and Eastern Europe, as others have done in past years.

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
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TURKEY: A bill to license opium poppy cultivation would set up new controls but leave several important questions unanswered.

The bill, set for presentation to parliament in November, calls for yearly permits to be issued to individual growers of good reputation who make proper application. Plots where the poppies are to be grown must be indicated clearly. Producers are required to sell the entire crop to the government, and stringent penalties are provided for those who fail to do so. The program will be overseen locally by mixed commissions drawn from various interested government agencies.

There is as yet no evidence, however, that Ankara has come to any decision regarding absolute limits on poppy cultivation, either through acreage allotments to individual growers or otherwise. Furthermore, the success of the program will depend on effective enforcement of the law, and it is far from certain that the government has this capability at present.



Government spokesmen express optimism about the licensing bill's chances for early passage. It is not yet clear whether effective parliamentary opposition to it will develop, but the Demirel government is sensitive to charges in the press that its campaign to limit opium production is an indication of subservience to the US.

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URUGUAY: Terrorists have turned their guns and bombs against US firms in a continuing effort to embarrass the Pacheco government.

Since 10 September, four US companies have been assaulted by terrorists believed to belong to the extreme leftist Tupamaros. ESSO, Coca Cola, ITT, and a large US textile firm have been either robbed, bombed, or burned; no casualties have resulted from the attacks.

US investment in Uruguay has a current value of about \$100 million, principally in manufacturing. Total foreign investment is relatively small and has not been a political issue. The Tupamaros, however, have singled out US officials and industry as suitable targets for terrorism; a US public safety official was murdered on 10 August and the Tupamaros have held a US agricultural specialist and a Brazilian diplomat hostage for almost six weeks. The Tupamaros hope such tactics will either force the ouster of the government or provoke President Pacheco into harsh reprisals that would break Uruguayan democratic tradition. [REDACTED]

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TRINIDAD-TOBAGO: Prime Minister Williams has suffered another in a series of political setbacks stemming from the black power demonstrations early this year.

The cabinet this week announced withdrawal of Williams' much criticized public order bill from congressional consideration. The move closely followed a rebuff from Williams' own party, when the party's general council opposed the legislation. The bill, another of Williams' responses to the black power demonstrations that threatened to topple the government early this year, was a tough measure granting the government wide-ranging, almost dictatorial powers.

Former cabinet minister A.N.R. Robinson, a member of Williams' party who resigned during the April disorders, has recently moved into open opposition to the government. Robinson, who strongly opposed the public order bill, is recognized as having far greater appeal than the older Williams to the youthful element, which was sympathetic to the protests. He is apparently laying the groundwork for a challenge to the long-time prime minister. Given the splintered state of the opposition in Trinidad, Robinson probably has a greater chance of succeeding to power by opposing Williams from within the party than by bolting the organization.

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